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In her target paper Janet Landa (2008) presents compelling evidence that cultural group
strategies are a major factor underlying the development and continuity of ethnically
homogeneous middleman trading groups (HMGs). HMG traders pass on the values
and institutions underlying within-group trust and punishment of free-riders which in
turn makes the group successful in risky markets. Landa finds that despite geograph-
ical separation the same HMG strategy has been adopted by different ethnic groups
to guarantee contracts in societies with weak contract law. The finding of convergent
cultural evolution is an important contribution to our knowledge of this subject.
I appreciate Landa’s autobiographical approach. She recounts the development of
her analysis beginning with her theory of ethnically homogeneous middleman groups
as club-like trading institutions for contract enforcement in the early 1980s, followed
by the incorporation of signaling theory, then HMGs as cultural transmission units in
early 1990s, and finally her conceptualization of HMGs as adaptive units within the
frame of multilevel-selection theory.
I find it significant that although Landa’s analysis relies on gene-culture co-evolution
theory it does not explore biological factors. Landa realizes that such factors must be
included in a comprehensive theory (Footnote 5) but chooses to focus on cultural
causes. In this comment I discuss some ways in which the analysis might be rounded
out to include behavioral biological factors and suggest how these contribute to the
success and continuity of HMGs. Landa’s analysis provides some of the evidence
needed to make this case.
Let us take a closer look at some key concepts, starting with ‘adaptation’. The
definition Landa quotes from Ghiselin entails survival and reproduction, which could
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be applied to genes. In neo-Darwinian theory genetic continuity and fitness are the
criteria of adaptation. If HMGs are adaptive units, in the biological sense, they must at
least preserve the genes of their constituent populations. In other words, to be adaptive
they must transmit genes, whether or not they also transmit culture.
Indeed that appears to be the case with HMGs because all the examples described
by Landa appear to be endogamous ethnic groups. An ethnic group is a named pop-
ulation whose members share a belief in common descent, have a shared history, a
distinctive shared culture, a shared attachment to a homeland, and some degree of
solidarity (Smith 1986, pp. 22–30). The idea that shared belief in common descent
is a core feature of ethnic identity goes back at least to Weber (1946/1922, p. 146).
Improving gene assay data indicate that people are generally correct in their beliefs
about shared ethnic origins (see review by Salter 2006/2003, Chap. 2). This is obvi-
ously true for endogamous minorities with historical memories of immigration from
afar, which appears to be the case in all of Landa’s examples.
The long range migration of ethnic middlemen means that their ethnic kinship—
the genetic similarity between random co-ethnics—is higher than it would be if they
derived from the populations among whom they serve as middlemen. In such cir-
cumstances ethnic kinship can be as high as that found among extended families
(Salter 2002). This means that the aggregate middleman ethnic group, numbering in
the thousands, amounts to a large genetic family. Thus calling the differential survival
and reproduction of HMGs group selection does not get to the point: it is actually
a culturally assisted version of extended kin selection as set out by Hamilton (1971,
1975) and Harpending (1979, 2002). It is to be expected that solidarity is enhanced
not only by religious and business institutions but by the often strong tie of ethnic
identity, what van den Berghe (1981) calls ethnic nepotism, and the generally weak
tie of gene-based similarity (Rushton 1989). Landa’s emphasis of the ‘immutable
physical characteristics’ that often distinguish ethnic/racial groups and which impede
intercourse between them supports this interpretation.
Viewed in this light, HMGs are genetic as well as cultural group strategies in the
sense that their distinguishing behaviors are caused by both genes and culture. The
adaptiveness of these gene-culture manifolds increases both their genetic and cultural
fitness.
The foregoing makes endogamy a critical variable for HMGs. All ethnic groups
show some endogamy. Research into the affiliative effects of similarity show shared
ethnicity to be among the strongest attractors of mates, friends and cooperators
(McPherson et al. 2001; Thiessen and Gregg 1980). Long-lasting diaspora peoples, of
which HMGs are examples, often institutionalize this universal tendency, I think as a
means of reproducing the group boundary and its benefits. The process parallels the
way spontaneous incest aversion is institutionalized in the form of incest prohibition
(Westermarck 1936/1970, p. 258; Salter in press).
Already discussed is the way endogamy helps a HMG reproduce solidarity—trust
and trustworthiness—down the generations by maintaining it as a descent group,
a necessary condition of ethnicity. Institutions that work on and strengthen ethnic
identity then maintain the collectivist advantages of reduced transaction costs and
competitiveness against outsiders described in the target paper.
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HMG competitiveness is not due solely to club-like institutions operating in socie-
ties with underdeveloped contract law. Two locations of successful HMGs discussed
by Landa, Amsterdam and New York, have had developed legal infrastructure for cen-
turies. A cause of this success appears to be individual competitiveness. When traders
possess human capital in the form of heritable traits that gives them an individual
competitive edge endogamy will reproduce those traits. In addition to institutional
synergies, members of HMGs also show strong work ethics and in most cases cited by
Landa elevated cognitive ability compared to neighboring ethnic groups. Those traits
are partly transmitted culturally in family and ethnic traditions. Landa documents the
cultural roles performed by leading HMG traders. But there are also genetic causes
of differences in IQ and conscientiousness, to name two characteristics bearing on
academic and economic success (Bouchard 1997; Flynn 1991; Gottfredson 1997). At
the end of the twentieth century average national IQ accounted for over 50% of the
global variation in GDP (Lynn and Vanhanen 2002). The same trend is likely to apply
to merchant groups because trading is cognitively demanding. Advantages in heritable
human capital are maintained by endogamy by preventing regression to the general
population mean (Salter 2008). Where no heritable advantage exists, endogamy is a
precondition for such an advantage to evolve through individual or group selection.
HMG are indeed trait groups, as Landa argues from the perspective of multi-level
selection theory. But they are trait groups not only because they reproduce culture but
because as inbred populations they reproduce heritable behaviors.
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